REFOUNDING TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS I: DECONTAMINATING PERSONALITY

In memoriam Muriel James, feminist & transactional analyst, 1917 – 2018

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ABSTRACT

This paper outlines a *refounding* of transactional analysis (TA); *a return to Berne*. Berne's grounding of TA in psychoanalysis is reviewed, establishing a rationale for a decontamination of the ego state theory of personality, and a consequent realignment of this model with a postmodern notion identity. This realignment then forms the basis for a deconstruction of the concepts of the drama triangle positions, process and structural script analysis.

INTRODUCTION

The most pertinent references are not always the most explicit ones, and no index of names will ever detect them. One would need an index of all that is not said: back-of-the-mind thoughts, cryptic allusions, resonances, and other invisibilia. Actually, I might just have a go at it one day.

(Miller, 2016:191).

In putting the most pertinent references on the side of the invisibled, Miller echoes the Freudian mantra that such thoughts are the domain of the unconscious, and that the psychoanalytic project comprises detecting and indexing such allusive resonances. This project, of course, is notoriously tricky, for while we can rely on the unconscious to 'speak its mind' with no deference to our civilized manner nor reference to the burden of translation that language imposes, we cannot rely on any guarantee of success with regard to this task of detecting, let alone that of indexing. Unconscious desires wish, after all, to *ex-press* but not be seen or heard; the repressed returns, but only cryptically.

Why have I begun a paper about transactional analysis (TA) with such a Freudian reference? Well, if Eric Berne is the father of TA, Sigmund Freud is its grandfather … or at least its great uncle. After becoming a medical doctor, Berne trained in a mid-twentieth-century U.S. translation of Freudian psychoanalysis and, though he forged his *radical psychiatry* in the fire of a resentful reaction to the deferral of his application to join the U.S. psychoanalytic club, Berne's TA was nonetheless born and raised in the fertile soil of a psychoanalytic orientation; and so it is to Freud that TA owes its intergenerational birthright.

It is a birthright that Berne loyally acknowledged. TA, he said in 1961, is a *preparatory* for psychoanalysis; it helps patients clean house so that they can more fully engage with their analysis. By the time he had sketched his final work (Berne, 1972) he had evolved in this belief; script analysis, a particular species of TA, could do the job just as well as, if not even better than psychoanalysis. This turn in Berne's view is often cited as a turning away from psychoanalysis, but such a view represents a misrecognition, one that ignores Berne's unwavering adherence to the pseudo-Freudian ethic of interpretation in which he had been schooled (Berne, 1966), as well as his final declaration of allegiance to psychoanalysis:

"Script analysts believe in the unconscious … [they] subscribe to the doctrines of Freud in their entirety" (Berne, 1972: 399-400).

Rather, Berne's intention was to *update* the psychoanalytic process by making it more efficient. In this intent Berne is, of course, not alone. In his 'return to Freud', Jacques Lacan - Berne's contemporary across the ocean - insisted that he was only correcting misunderstandings of Freudian theory and its

implications, though Jean Laplanche (1989) is rather more earnest in his own project of 'refounding psychoanalysis', in which he aimed to correct psychoanalysis' trajectory from the point at which he saw Freud as going astray.

From the very start Berne placed the unconscious on the side of the Child ego state. As we have seen, after he proposed his 1961 formula that decontamination prepare patients for psychoanalysis, his final position – that of the script analyst – was that *deconfusion* could more efficiently accomplish the task psychoanalysis had originally set itself. Miller's detecting and indexing thus corresponds to Berne's unfolding of the script and deconfusion, techniques that first and foremost address the Child. Most transactional analysts since Berne who have attempted to more explicitly account for the unconscious and its attendant transference have similarly focused upon this ego state, most notably the Italian colleagues Carlo Moiso and Michel Novellino, who founded transactional *psycho*analysis in the 1980s, and the UK analysts Helena Hargaden and Charlotte Sills who have developed Moiso's original templates in an integration of the American relational ethic.

However, just as Laplanche has argued regarding Freud, it is my contention that Berne's bequeathal of the unconscious to the ego state model of personality represents a point at which Berne went astray, a category error (Wittgenstein, 1953) that has been perpetrated by those following in his footsteps. In this paper, I show how this has resulted in three flaws that threaten the integrity of TA philosophy, theory and practice; first, that the ego state model of personality has become distorted through attempts to use it to account for the unconscious, something for which it is not fit for purpose; second, that TA proper has been erroneously deployed to account for the transference; and third, that despite Berne's avowed loyalty to Freudian doctrine, the unconscious remains invisibled within TA, thus representing a ghost in the machine that haunts the potency and reach of TA.

Let me briefly address the latter before turning to the first and second.

TevAt Berne

I am no prophet - and here's no great matter

(Eliot, 1917:15)

Lest my conclusion above sound like a fanfare for a TA model of the unconscious, let me head-off any disappointment at this point and say that this article does not represent the launch of such a mighty ark. Why not? Because proposing a TA model of the unconscious would be like reinventing the wheel; it is not necessary when psychoanalysis itself has developed comprehensive structural and functional models can be productively used *alongside* TA concepts.

This idea of 'alongside' is in itself of course not new. In Little (2004) for example, we find an adoption of Fairbairn's model of selfhood, a reference that Little uses to inform a critique of existing ego state theory and develop some eloquent patches, such as the principle of ego state units. And I (2011) have acknowledged my own subscription to a Laplanchian model of the unconscious and outlined some of the ways in which this perspective can speak *with* existing TA concepts such as the theories of personality, games and scripts. The vicissitudes of such a subscription are discussed and illustrated by Leupnitz (2009) who refers to both Lacanian and Winnicottian perspectives in her own work. Such an *amalgam* does not represent an integration, which comprises an assimilation of one theory by

another under the modernist auspices of the creation of one true grand narrative, but rather a *dialectical holding*, one that produces a tension between perspectives that is itself generative and creative. Such an ethic, after all, is in line with the analytic understanding that we ourselves are divided subjects, and that our own productivity – both individually and collectively – is generated by the friction inherent in our contradictory natures.

In this regard, then, the approach I outline here represents a *template* for such an amalgam, rather than a brand(ed) new TA model; a return to Berne (*à la* Lacan) that aims to scaffold a creative dialogue *between* a refounded TA (*à la* Laplanche) and psychoanalytic models of the unconscious and attendant transference. And just as Laplanche subjected psychoanalysis to a psychoanalysis, I begin this refounding of TA with a *decontamination* of the theory of personality and of TA proper, since it is these stalwarts that have been most contaminated by the going astray to which I referred above.

THE CONTAMINATION OF THE EGO STATE THEORY OF PERSONALITY

Berne built his ego state model upon the foundations of Freud's (1923) second topology of the 'apparatus of the soul'; the Es, Ich and Über-Ich, the Latin translation of the second term of which Berne adopted in christening his model. Crucially, he did *not* employ the first of Freud's topographies – the unconscious, preconscious and conscious – and since Freud was clear that the two topographies do *not* map onto one another, Berne's choice of the second topology as template for his theory of personality thus elides the notion of the unconscious from the very start.

Berne initially proposed a *five* differing ego state model in order to account for an ambitious and increasingly wide-ranging arc/ark of psychic phenomena, including;

1. **the development of a *sense of self* (Child).** The source of this is Berne's (1961:52–54) reference to a near-infinite regression of *historical* Child ego states depicted as a stack of bent pennies representing the effect of trauma upon a personality formation-as-compensation, thus rendering the notion of selfhood pathological
2. **the function of *reality testing* (Adult).** Berne originally termed this *probability* testing, which is both more accurate and useful, at least from an analytic perspective. As a result of this 'flight to reality', to paraphrase Freud, the monolithic modernist fantasy of 'reality' continues to contaminate our understanding of the function of the Adult
3. **the establishment of *values* (Parent).** Berne viewed these as internalized, or *introjected*, giving rise to problems regarding processes of *integration* within the ego state model, representing another enduring confusion under which TA labors
4. ***prejudices*** (Parent contaminated Adult) and
5. ***delusions*** (Child contaminated Adult). Along with prejudices, delusions constitute the anomaly of contaminated, or *erroneous* representation for which decontamination was originally developed with the aim of "correcting the patient" (Berne, 1961:50). I (2003) have prevoiusly critiqued the modernist conceit by which the expert's view of 'reality' is used to require the patient's conformity; a relatively mild dose of the kind of brutality Foucault has traced in the psychiatric tradition. Rather, a postmodernist refounding of the notion of decontamination is on the side of a Deridian *deconstruction* (as I demonstrate in the following decontamination of the theory of personality)

These five ego states are technically if idealistically reducible to three through the six operations that comprise decontamination, conceived of metaphorically as a scraping of barnacles of the hull of a boat (Berne, 1961), or technically as a process of ego state *boundary realignment* (Berne, 1966). And since Berne conceptualized the remit of each ego state in terms of a structure (content) that generates function (process), he proposed two corresponding *modes* of ego states in order to distinguish between these irreducible properties of personality.

These two modes were developed further to accommodate greater subtlety and nuance of personality in such a way as to *subdivide* content and emergent function. Structural subdivisions have resulted in classes of ego state models of increasing order nested within one another, functional subdivisions in a plethora of diverse properties such as the role of nurture, criticism, integration, compliance and rebellion. The rationale for this mitosis-like evolution leans upon the Freudian dynamics of introjection and splitting (Kellett, 2007b and 2007c); concepts that refer us back to the second topology with regard to the increasing differentiation of the id and superego in respect of the ego.

Thus, the initial inflationary expansion of ego state theory resulted in the proliferation of structural and functional states that from the start conflated personality and selfhood so that, in his attempt to accommodate an increasing number of creatures, Berne's ark soon began to list.

CRACKS IN THE HULL
This listing can be seen, for example, in a number of inconsistencies *within* the so-called 'three ego state model' that provides common ground for the classical, cathexis, redecision, psychodynamic and relational schools, as well as inconsistencies *between* this model and the so-called 'one' or 'integrated ego state model' that underpins the integrative and cocreative schools. These two models – let us call them type A and B respectively – are at odds over developmental, functional and structural issues. For example, while type A models ascribe an arbitrary, linear timeline to the formation of ego states (the infant is born as Child and goes on to develop first Parent, then Adult capacities) type B models do not (Parent and Child are embryonically present at birth in the Adult, from which they progressively split-off as a defensive strategy for accommodating trauma). This gives rise to a number of inconmensurabilities, including that type A models assign all functions developed up to an arbitrarily-defined chronological age as the property of the Child, whereas type B models assign various arbitrarily-defined 'well-integrated' functions developed at any age as the property of the Adult, and only 'fixations' as the property of archaic ego state units.

In part, this arbitrariness of definition is due to the contingent nature of socially-constructed values, whereby what is determined as functional (OK) or pathological (not-OK) is defined according to the situated socio-historical norms of a given culture and time. Such norms can be seen, for example, in the definition of function as *either* positive or negative, integrated or fixated; a product of the "reversible complementarities" that characterise the modernist fantasy (Benjamin, 1998:xiv). The postmodernist turn has decentred such "apparent immutability" (*ibid.* p. xvii) presenting a challenge that the TA model of OK-ness has yet to acknowledge, let alone address. Ultimately, such theoretical confusion with regard to which ego state function we are concerned represents a fundamental design flaw in the seaworthiness of ego state theory according to its own internal logic.

After Berne, ongoing attempts to patch such cracks in the hull of our ego state ark have resulted only in *increasingly* complex topographies, of which the acrobatic contortions drawn up in the Schiffs' (1975) attempts to represent the structure of psychosis are amongst the more creative examples. By far the more commonplace attempt to re-ballast our sinking ark has continued the structural subdivision of ego states outlined previously, resulting in a kaleidoscoping of which the most common type involves the assignment of *function* to a cascade of ego states in direct contradiction to Berne's warning that function should not be conflated with structure. The first of such errors is exemplified by the second-order split in the Child as a consequence of Steiner's (1979) 'Pig Parent', a fracturing further compounded by the Gouldings' (1976) attempt to graft the Gestalt concept of the impasse onto type A ego state models.

This fragmentation of ego states has reached tipping point in one of the most currently populist of schools in TA; the relational school. Here, Hargaden and Sills' (2002) model of 'the self' perpetuates the error of combining the structural and functional, resulting in a model that inflates the Child while jettisoning content and function of both Parent and Adult. Their model telescopes type A ego state structure into the Child *thrice* over, then transplants into this partitioned ego state Stern's (1985) functional organs of selfhood. In order to compensate for the consequent problems of mixing OK and not-OK functions, Hargaden and Sills further quarantine what is regarded as pathological within this matrix, technically creating an unacknowledged *fourth* order.

So too do other models that attempt to pressgang the ego state model into accounting for deconfusion in this way, such as that proposed by Fowlie (2005). In this pseudo-developmental account, the child-as-noble-savage is more or less traumatised by the mother's narcissistic and/or sado-masochistic neglect, a shameful wounding that results in the child hiding away an innate and valorised 'true self', one that Fowlie accommodates through the construction of yet another quarantined enclave within the Child, though one that, this time, functions more like a protectorate. Fowlie's consequent attempt to explain confusion thus ends up conflating deconfusion and integration, and in its idolisation of infanthood, and complementary demonization of motherhood, her model risks the charge of pathologisation.

Consequently, while these models are offered as a way to conceptualise the fragmentation of selfhood they claim is the common zeitgeist, they in fact generate the very phenomenon for which they seek to account, and only further hasten the sinking of TA's ark of personality.

AN OAR WITH NO BOAT
As the seat of selfhood, Hargaden and Sills assert that their Child is the origin of a variety of transferential dynamics, drawing upon Moiso's (1985) attempt to account for a number of Freudian transferential dynamics using a type A ego state model, an attempt that is itself premised on a common misinterpretation of Berne's model of TA proper.

Berne (1961) had initially proposed that certain crossed transactions might be used to map the more common transferential dynamics. However, since he had defined crossed transactions as involving *social*-level transacting – transactions, that is, that are in awareness and that, therefore, cannot by definition be transferential – Berne made little further reference to this assertion. In its stead, he turned to the notion of *ulterior* transactions – those defined as being out of awareness - and, for a while, held out the hope that these offered a theoretically congruent account of transferential

dynamics. However, Berne inadvertently demonstrated that ulterior transactions are strokes of which the person who communicates them is *aware*; the famous salesman, for example, whose well-rehearsed ulterior angular snare so artfully hooks the poor gullible housewife, fully *intends* the deception he perpetrates (*ibid*). Indeed, we could say that he *makes it his business*, one that is literally at the heart of his sense of identity ('the *sales*man'). Thus, Berne rules out the possibility that transactions on *either* social or ulterior levels could possibly account for the transference.

The models developed by Moiso, as well as Hargaden and Sills ignore this fundamental impossibility, and thus erroneously deploy ego state models in their attempt to anchor the notion of the unconscious, and TA proper to chart the currents of the transference.

This is a problem that also haunts Novellino's (2003) attempt to bequeath the unconscious to the Adult, an attempt that also generates a number of inconmensurabilities for both types of ego state models. With regard to type A models, Novellino's proposals conflict with Hargaden and Sills' relegation of selfhood and attendant dynamics of transference to the Child. This is not in and of itself a problem, given my critique here, but this contradiction does raise the spectre of a transference not grounded in the unconscious, a conundrum Novellino attempts to circumvent with the proposal of a novel if nonsensical notion of an unconscious communication that does not qualify as transferential.

Regarding type B models, Novellino's proposal contradicts the principle of integration that is a defining feature of such model types, since the idea that the Integrated Adult contains within it something unavailable to awareness, and thus unintegrated, is self-evidently also nonsensical. It is possible, of course, that this contradiction indicates that TA's concept of integration is in need of review, something that may very well be warranted since one of Freud's principle characterisations of the unconscious is that it *resists* integration. This resistance on the part of the unconscious is at the heart of its insistent persistence, and crucial to TA, not least since it anchors Berne's (1961) third rule of communication. If we recognise this ghost in the machine – or, perhaps more pertinently, this *deus ex machina* – as a property of the Adult, we will need to fundamentally evolve our definition of integration and our construction of its role as a formative function within type two ego state models.

A promising research project, perhaps. Returning, however, to our project here; is it not clear at this point that our ego state models of personality and dynamics of TA proper are floundering at sea? To conclude on our nautical note; *attempting to account for the structure and function of the unconscious using Berne's model of personality and TA proper is like trying to contain the sea within a boat; the boat sinks.*

PERSONALITY DECONTAMINATED

Then how should I begin
To spit out all the butt-ends of my days and ways?

(Eliot, 1917:14-15)

If this crisis of the TA theory of personality is the result of attempts to pressgang Berne's original model to account for the entire species of selfhood, if the ego state model is too frail a vessel to navigate the undercurrents of the unconscious, and TA proper the swells of the transference, then the ego state model of personality warrants *de-barnacling* (Berne, 1961:49) in order to remain afloat.

The barnacles that need scraping off are, of course, the notion of the unconscious and its attendant transferential dynamics, and I have pointed out above that TA need not remake the unconscious in its own image, and illustrated instead Berne's enjoiner to subscribe to existing psychoanalytic models and use these dialectically alongside TA.

Once we have disabused the ego state model of the delusion of the unconscious, what then is returned to us? I (2011) have previously outlined a formulation of selfhood using Laplanche's revision of the Freudian notion of the apparatus of the soul as a template by which we can (re)position a number of TA concepts *including* that of personality. In this formulation, *personality represents an aspect of selfhood* that can be characterised as a *surface*, a *skin* at which outside *trans-acts* with inside, an *inter-face* that can be categorised in terms of two inter(-)actional functions; *inward facing* and *outward facing* (by 'facing' I mean both in the sense of a direction, as in facing North, and in the sense of a cover, as in 'making a face'); a model of personality that honors Berne's original ethic of TA as a *social* psychology.

 Let us take a look at the second face before portraying the first.

Outward Facing

> *There will be time, there will be time*
> *To prepare a face to meet the faces that you meet*

(Eliot, 1917:14)

It is now common knowledge – even if it is not commonly understood throughout our post-truth worlds – that there is no one true time but rather a *multiplicity* of times, and that relativity is *stratified* (Rovelli, 2018. See Kellett, 2003, for an example of this effect on the nature of objectivity in the clinic). In a similar vein, from the perspective of the notion of personality I propose here, there is no one true 'core' to personality, but rather an historical *layering of infinite regression*, a concept that echoes Berne's (1961) metaphor of personality as a stack of bent pennies, and parallels the Freudian notion of the screen memory (Freud, 1899).

Butler (1988) for example, has shown how such once-assumed core aspects of personality such as gender are performative rather than fixed, a fluid dance joined in response to the overture of the social, written in the flesh of an embodiment that is always/already scripted by the gaze of others (Lacan, 1973/1981). Such performances are malleable and responsive to ever-shifting external dynamics (Kellett, 2004) representing a *facing* that takes time to prepare, an organisation (more accurately, an *organising strategy*) constrained by the vicissitudes of socio-historically constructed rules and codes, laws and outlaws, norms and aberrations, opportunities and obstacles, enjoyments and disappointments.

The infant is *necessarily* introduced (in)to this increasing variation over time, *at different times*, and at a good-enough rate, all being well, so that such moments can be more or less integrated into a coherent-enough narrative according to the function of the Adult. Why do I say necessarily? It may be obvious that the infant must take time to integrate their encounters with the external worlds into which they find themselves thrown, but it is perhaps less obvious that the infant cannot refuse the demand to respond to this throwness, that they must answer, one way or another. We are all *interpellated* (Saussure, 1959); hailed by and into a matrix that is the operational product of the Freudian notion of civilisation, one delineated by the discursive formations and dynamics of power

that Foucault has described, and structured by language in the ways in which Lacan has illuminated. Of course, some answer this call with a *refusal* (a turning away, resulting, for example, in certain forms of narcissism) some even miss the boat entirely (resulting in structural psychosis), but most of us (neurotics) answer with a more or less grudgingly acquiescent "present", as in a classroom rollcall. Once answered affirmatively in this way, we must stand up and give an account of ourselves (Butler, 2005) and it is in the service of this accounting that the outward facing of personality is organised.

Like a magnet, we can think of two poles to the function of personality, poles that correspond to the outward and inward facing dialectic respectively. The function of the outward facing of personality is *positively-charged*. Its charge, in the sense of a *task*, is to facilitate a getting-along-with, or at least the appearance of doing so, and as such it can be regarded as *attractive*, to continue my magnetic metaphor. The positive drive of this adaptation – positive in that it functions according to the socio-historic, culturally-situated definitions of 'healthy' – represents a function of the Integrated Adult, reflecting the qualities of spontaneity, respect for the relative autonomy of self and others, and invitation to intimacy as defined by Berne (1961). It is, in short, a 'good thing', facilitating an individual's navigation of their desire in a world of demands, negotiating the principles of pleasure and reality (Freud, 1920) with the aim of maximum satisfaction and minimum distraction.

Thus, such a function of the outward facing of personality represents *ways-of-being-with* that structure thinking, feeling and behaving etc. and that take into account socially-determined meanings and functions (Kellett, 2007c). This adaptation can be seen either as *active* (a going-along more or less whole-heartedly with) or *passive* (an *appearing* to go-along, something that is somewhat less-hearted); both representing a *strategy* designed to create a good impression, to keep up appearances, to conjure up the illusion of a straight stack, to refer to Berne's (1961) metaphor of personality as a stack of more or less bent pennies.

INWARD FACING

This metaphor refers us to the other face of personality, the inward facing function. This stacking is the way in which Berne portrayed the *effect* of trauma – the bending of a penny that represents a historical moment in the repertoire of personality – for though trauma is formed as a response to something that appears to come from *without*, something that cannot be integrated, its mark is left *within*. From this angle, then, personality represents an emergent property functioning as an adaptive strategy fashioned to (re)cover (from) trauma, a forcefield designed to *repel* eruptions *from within*.

In this sense, the inward face of personality is *negative*, representing the function of (fixated) Parent-Child ego state units (Little, 2004). Such units may involve a collusive dynamic in which the Parent eggs on, or turns a blind eye to the Child's destructive will, for example, or a conflictual dynamic in which Parent and Child are at war over values and desire respectively. Either way, while aggression is an existential part of any adaptation, in the negative function this aggression is destructive and frames a repetition that is the foundation of the script and related manifestations such as games, a repetition that bears the sign of the symptom and, thus, the unconscious, the invisibled.

With regard to this sign, we can think of the notion of personality as akin to what I (2015b) have previoiusly referred to as a *scab* or a *scar*; the sign of an attempt at healing that belies an earlier wounding, a sign in which we can detect the incorporation of identifications deployed as sutures or

stiches, designed to hold things together, band aids or makeup to cover what threatens to reopen, *to keep at bay the return of the repressed*.

These two facings are inseparable and inter(-)act in an ongoing balancing-act, one intended to keep the plates spinning, so to speak, an act of propping-up, and in this sense they lean upon one another. Each ego state is structured in time to account for both inward and outward facing functions, and this structure is reflected in a number of related concepts within TA, concepts such that consequently warrant refounding.

Process Scripts

I have previously discussed how process scripts (Kahler, 1968, Berne, 1972) offer one way in which we can think about how the popular myths of a given culture provide a repertoire of ready-to-wear characters and storylines by which we choose to clothe the varying size and shape of our attempts to consolidate a sense of having a place in the world (Kellett, 2004). A fitting in, perhaps, rather than a bespoke tailoring; either way an attractive fit that holds out the promise of recognition and belonging, of (ad)dressing the existential dilemma of structure-hunger (Berne, 1961), of forging a currency for the economy of enjoyment, and ultimately of creating a sense of meaning and purpose through rehearsal of such parables as *The Emperor's Clothes*, and the (re)production of their tragi-comic denouements.

Process script theory articulates how such myths distill over time, coalescing to form the 'encultured codes' by which our sense of identity is socially constructed (Kellett, 2006). As we have seen, one of the hallmarks of postmodernism is the acknowledgement that there always/already exists a shifting *plurality* of situated narratives by which we represent our lived experiences. Little Red Riding Hood, for example, may still be compliantly/rebelliously running errands for her/his (m)other in the hope/fear of encountering a hungry/fed-up wolf (see Berne, 1972) though the wolf may well have other fantasies to digest. Indeed, if the wolf wants to avoid getting knifed by a roaming Woody, s/he may do well to tuck their tale between their legs and steer clear of cruising under-aged Hoodies. And as for grandma, while s/he may harbour all sorts of ambivalent desires about the prospect of being 'eaten' by a hungry wolf, the promise of being (symbolically) reborn is a well-rehearsed fantasy dear not only to many-a society's elderly.

In elucidating the proliferation of such narratives that speak (to) our analysands today there awaits a fruitful *ethnographic* research project.

Drama Triangle Positions

The drama triangle (Kahler, 1968) offers a useful way in which we can categorise the identity positions made available in these myths. This model has been fruitfully extended to accommodate a greater variety of categories, such as that of the Bystander (Clarkson, 1992) and here again further qualitative research may elaborate new categories that play a formative role in today's matrices. For example, building on my (2006) previous discussion of the position of the Law from a Lacanian perspective, does it not seem warranted to include such a position in today's dramas? After all, the role of law-enforcement and legislative identities such as the police, judges and politicians have figured prominently in society for centuries. Now, it may well be that we can classify such roles along existing Persecutor (Prosecutor) or Rescuer (Defender) positions in any given situation – perhaps the Law could even at times be classified in the Victim position, such as in the attacks on the judiciary by the

right-wing legislature in Poland, or the perversion of the U.S. Supreme Court nomination process by Republican Senators, both in 2016 – but I am thinking more fundamentally here about the position of *Authority*, perhaps in the guise of the Expert to whom the parties who are gamely engaged appeal for legitimacy. After all, as Berne (1964) outlined in a number of consulting room games (such as 'Do Me Something' and 'Gee You're Wonderful') and as Allen (2003) has further elaborated, the analyst is often ostensibly enjoined to take up just such an expert position. And where the analyst colludes with such an appeal a familiar game sequence plays out with predictable payoffs that (re)confirm the positions in which the various players are invested.

The Schiffs' (1975) redefining hexagon characterises the various combinations of social and psychological levels that comprise differing identity positions made available in the service of games and scripts. These combinations are evident in our brief example of Little Red Riding Hood, since this myth illustrates how *multiple positions* are adopted *at one and the same time*, and that one position can be used as a *ruse* to hide another, something crucial to game theory and often most evident at the moment of the cross-up (Berne, 1964). Such a ruse is legislated by the Law, and the con and gimmick as well as the repetitive sequence of the game play must similarly adhere to the implicit and explicit rules of engagement laid down by a given society in order for the game to work (not least since crying foul forfeits the payoff, unless the cry is itself the payoff). The reinforcement of racket feelings (English, 1971) as well as core script beliefs (Erskine and Zalcman, 1979) that are claimable by all parties at the end of play are similarly situated, as Berne (ibid.) so clearly elucidates in his account of the social advantages of games.

STRUCTURAL SCRIPT THEORY
Structural script theory can also be applied to a postmodern notion of identity (Kellett van Leer, 2004). The original script matrix (Steiner, 1974) has enjoyed a degree of productive revision in, for example, Summers and Tudor's (2000) review incorporating a multiplicity of individually-relevant and socially-constructed axes such as gender, sexuality, race and class, etc. And though these axes rely upon bipolar stereotypes, time will tell the extent to which this represents a modernist nostalgia at the heart of Summers and Tudor's model in contrast to the enduring power of such stereotypes within postmodern mythologies. Will, for example, the 'straight-gay' axis predominate amongst so many additional categories such as asexual, bisexual, trans and queer? It may be, after all, that for a given identity the most formative dimension inscribed is 'bisexual-queer', thus incorporating centers of gravity that can hardly be characterised as opposing. And given the plurality of parental figures that have formed families for many decades, should we not consider *multi*axial configurations of three or more centers of formative influence; for example, gay (first mother) – trans (father) – queer (second mother)? In this way, a postmodernist structural script theory would need to account for multiple non-oppositional dimensions of situated influence.

Both functional and structural script theories, then, offer a map by which we can plot how the patriarchal values and norms of the Cultural Parent (Drego, 1983) are communicated to the infant, refracted through the lens of the frames of reference of significant (m)others (Schiff et al., 1975) via injunctions (Goulding and Goulding, 1976) and drivers (Kahler, 1974). Of course, script and counterscript messages too evolve over time, and vary from culture to culture (as Tudor, 2008, has highlighted, for example) and so here again we find the need for ongoing research in order to anchor theory in lived experience.

FURTHER THOUGHTS

In this refounding of the TA theory of personality and related concepts I have evidently made no reference to analytic technique. This is not least because clinical vignettes are often misleading since they all too easily present the semblance of an *authorised* way of working, one that stifles creativity, individuality and critical reflection. Furthermore, a postmodern approach to TA does not dictate any *one* technique, but rather lends theoretical grounding to a diversity of practices, offering a scaffolding, if not an underpinning, to the position and operations of the analyst. Nonetheless, there are consequences for technique given the refounding offered here. How an analysist conceives of the structure and function of an analysand's ego states, the operation and reach of TA proper, and the nature of the unconscious, for example, will guide the understanding and framing of their handling of presenting issues, contracting, architecture of analysis (such as strategy of interventions) as well as their conceptualisation of 'cure'.

In my own practice these consequences have been profound, not least due to my taking up of Berne's invitation to adhere to Freudian doctrine – in my case, a doctrine as developed through the lens of a contemporary paradigm – a doctrine that come into play particularly when it comes to engaging with analysands at the level of selfhood, that which I have proposed the inward facing of personality is constructed to hide. Such evolution in practice can seem ominous since we may feel that we are (again) on less sure footing, if not lost at sea. Nevertheless, as Barnes (2005:6) has put it, "… if you want people to change, you have to change, I have to change, we have to change, our theories have to change."

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